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Frank P. Grad* The Ascendancy of
Legislation: Legal Problem
Solving in Our Time
I. Introduction
Law making in our time depends on legislation, and our primary
reliance on statutory law is being increasingly recognized, even
though, as James Williard Hurst recently put it, "Judge-made law is
still the darling of legal philosophers."' It has also remained at the
misplaced center of much of our legal education.'
I hope to trace the movement toward the full acceptance of sta-
tutes as a source of law, including brief notes on early twentieth
century efforts to salvage the common law through the machinery of
law revision commissions and through the Restatements developed
by the American Law Institute. The New Deal Legislation of the
1930's not only applied legislation to the solution of the economic,
social, and, ultimately legal problems of its times, but it also changed
the very nature of the legislative product. The ascendancy of legisla-
tion resulted not only in a far greater legislative output, but also in
the development of massive programmatic legislation, unique in its
character and different in kind from the narrow, limited statutes that
had preceded it. So significant is this new form that some of the older
rules of statutory construction seem hardly relevant in their applica-
tion. But the new legislative approach, here referred to as program-
matic legislation, imposes a responsibility for legal training which
develops to the fullest the ability to use legislation as the way to solve
today's legal problems.
*Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, and Director, Legislative Drafting
Research Fund, Columbia Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the
research assistance of David Novello, Columbia '83; Marc R. Packer, Columbia '83;
Roy Pulvers, Columbia '83; John Daly, Columbia '85; and Lisa Robinson, Colum-
bia '85. Most of the students named were Kenneth V. Santagata Research Assistants
of the Legislative Drafting Research Fund. The text is a slightly revised version of the
Tenth Horace E. Read Memorial Lecture delivered at Dalhousie Law School on
Thursday, September 20, 1984.
1. J.W. Hurst, DEALING WITH STATUTIES 1 (1982).
2. See, e.g., R. Williams, Statutory Law in Legal Education: Still Second Class
After All These Years, 35 Mercer L. Rev. 803 (1984).
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II. The Waning of the Nineteenth Century
The ascendancy of legislation in the twentieth century has not been
exactly a triumphal march. Although there had been some interest in
codification in the early eighteen hundreds,3 and although the Field
Codes drew some favorable, as well as critical, attention to legislation
in the 1870's and 1880's,4 judicial hostility to legislation around the
end of the nineteenth century had reached outrageous proportions,5
as had academic hostility, personified to some extent in Professor
Langdell who celebrated the spirit of the common law by actively
opposing the introduction of courses in legislation both at Harvard
and at other places where he could assert his influence.6
There were several reasons for hostility to statutory law. There was
the general intellectual and historical commitment to the common
law - a belief that it was capable of such flexibility and adaptability
3. See J. Bentham, Codification and Public Instruction 30-33 (1817); J. Story,
Report on the Codification of the Common Law, in The Miscellaneous Writings of
Joseph Story 698 (1852).
4. D.D. Field, Reasons for Codification, in 3 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 239 (L. Coan ed.
1884-90); J. Carter, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON
LAW (1884); L. Friedman, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 351-55 (1973).
5. Courts not only applied the strict construction doctrine, but sometimes simply
disregarded relevant statutes, citing case law as if the legislation did not exist. Pound,
Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 385-6, (1908); H.F. Stone,
The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 12-14 (1936). See also
G. Gilmore, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 63-64 (1977). See Friedman,
supra note 4 at 314-318, commenting in some detail on the "randomly and irrespon-
sibly" exercised judicial power as applied to late nineteenth century public health
and labor legislation. Among other examples, Friedman refers to Godcharles v.
Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431, 6 At. 354 (1886) which required mining companies to
pay their employees at least once a month, and in cash, not in scrip. Invalidating the
statute, the court had referred to the interference with freedom of contract, and
added that the law "was an insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legislative
tutelage, which is not only degrading to his manhood, but also subversive of his
rights as a citizen of the United States." Id. at 315.
6. Williams, supra note 2, at 805-806. For a discussion of Langdell's influence on
the legal thinking of the time, see Gilmore, supra note 5, at 42-48, 57-65. Professor
Gilmore describes Langdell as a stupid man who had a single good idea which he
rode all his life, rather successfully, because it came at the right time and provided
great support for the conservatism of the age, and for the development of American
law schools. See also, K. Llewellyn, JURISPRUDENCE, REALISM IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 379, recounting an incident before the founding of the Chicago
Law School, when Langdell and Dean Ames of Harvard became exercised over the
proposed teaching of legislation in Chicago by Ernest Freund and came close to
stopping Professor Joseph Beale, who was then on leave from Harvard, from going
to Chicago to become its first dean.
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as to respond to all emerging legal problems.7 There was also a sense
that its seamless web would be rent and ravelled by the intrusion of
discordant statutory prescriptions.8 There was also the strong sense
that common law development had stood the country and its people
in good stead, and had contributed to the entrepreneurial spirit of
America.9 In the last part of the nineteenth century, legislation was
perceived as an instrumentality to advance dangerous and unhealthy
tendencies. State interference in the affairs of people would sap their
strength by obstructing their right to contract freely, and providing
unwarranted protection for persons who either were, or should be,
7. James Carter, then President of the American Bar Association, the chief oppo-
nent of the codification proposals of David Dudley Field, strongly argued this
position. See Carter, supra note 4, at 29-40. The position is stated, discussed and
refuted in Freund, Jurisprudence and Legislation, in 7 Congress of Arts and Science,
Universal Exposition, St. Louis 1904 (1904). For an animated discourse in praise of
the evolutionary nature of the common law, see Law Making, Address by Hon. John
W. Griggs, Governor of New Jersey 10-13 (August 26, 1897) at the 1897 Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association. For a contemporary discussion of the
issue, see Hurst, supra note 1, at 11-12 26.
8. Gilmore, supra note 5, at 61-64; Friedman, supra note 4, at 17. The notion was
best expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter who commented on the view of legislation
"as willful and arbitrary interference with the harmony of the common law and with
its rational unfolding by judges."
9. See Glasgow, A Dangerous Tendency of Legislation, 37 Am. L. Rev. 845, 845
(1903). The article consists of an address delivered by the author, of Roanoke,
Virginia, before the 1903 meeting of the American Bar Association in Hot Springs,
Virginia. The author decries "the present tendency of legislation" to threaten the
"independence of the individual" by reliance on "a paternal government." (At 845)
The address celebrates the spirit of Robert E. Lee, making the point that "The
highest type of man is not produced by the aid of a paternal government, but by
assurances of protection in his natural rights, with encouragement to individual
character." (At 851) For further discussions of the relationship between nineteenth
century laissez-faire philosophy and judicial hostility toward legislation, see
Gilmore, supra note 5, at 65-66; M. Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 at 258-59 (1977).
231 The Dalhousie Law Journal
able to take care of themselves.' 0 If the nineteenth century warning
against the excesses of legislation was couched in language both
pious and pompous, it probably reflected the spirit of the times.
The hostility to statutory law was often expressed in terms of
support for the common law and the system of case law develop-
ment. " The strength of the common law, then as now, requires little
explication. It provides a jurisprudence firmly rooted in the realities
of a particular controversy between parties, and it has little of the
civilian theorizing.' 2 In the hands of good judges, it is capable of
flexible adjustments by the wider or narrower restatement of the
earlier rule, and the clever manipulation of what is found to have
been holding, and what dictum, in earlier cases. One of its great
strengths from a conservative point of view is that it does not look to
the future, but is invariably retroactive in pronouncing the law to
resolve a legal problem which has already occurred, and whose signif-
icant events are safely in the past. While the decision of a case may
state the law for the future, it does so only as an incidental result of
10. See Glasgow, supra note 9, at 845-51. In Slaymaker, Labor Legislation - Its
Scope and Tendency, 64 Albany L.J. 227 (1902), the author decries the use of the
police power to define the hours of labor; freedom of contract means that if a person
wants "to sacrifice a degree of health to the attainment of laudable ends, the state
can not restrain him." (at p. 229) While women and children may need protection,
men "deal at arms' length" and need no law to even out purported social
inequalities. So, too, in Austin, Legislation Adverse to Railroad Corporations, 11
American Lawyer 341 (1903), the argument is made that corporations and natural
persons have equal rights before the law, and courts are not "justified in sustaining
statutes imposing new and additional burdens upon railroad corporations under the
so-called police power of the state." The article complains that new requirements
imposed on railroads which involve additional capital expenditures are deprivations
of property without due process, cutting off the possibility of payment of dividends.
See, also, Warren, Massachusetts as a Philanthropic Robber, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 316
(1898). For a more generous 1887 view, see Field, The Needs of Legislation, 35
Albany L.J. 84 (1887), which advocated limited government and the right to be left
alone, but supports tenement laws and child care laws that provide protection
against social disruption without interference with others. See also Friedman, infra,
note 15.
11. See, e.g., Carter, supra, note 4 and note 7; Griggs, supra, note 7, at 10-13;
Gilmore, supra, note 5, at 62-64.
12. Hurst, supra note 1, at 26; R. Pound, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERI-
CAN LAW (1938) at 46, comments on the fact that the "common law has never
been at its best in administering justice from written texts." Historically, he believed,
common lawyers found it difficult to reason from statute by analogy, as did the
civilians.
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deciding a case whose facts are in the past. 3 The common law system
has been developed successfully in private law, but support for case
law approaches need not have resulted in such overwhelming opposi-
tion to legislation.
The hostility to statutes at the turn of the century was so shrill and
intemperate, however, that it calls for an explanation. The legal
establishment at the turn of the century hated statutes because it was
afraid of them, and because it was afraid of the people who passed
them. Contemporary writings of the 1890's abound in expressions of
concern that legislation was going too far in giving new rights to
employees and in undermining the sanctity of contracts. Legislation
would be used to unsettle society - by depriving the well-to-do of
their legal protections. It would substitute statutory requirements of
job safety and would impose minimum wage requirements and place
a limit on hours worked, in lieu of the freedom of contract which
would allow laborers to "agree" on such matters with their rather
more powerful employers. Thus, the emphasis was on the protection
of freedom of contract, though not on the protection of employees .14
The fear of legislation and its uses was parelleled by the fear and
antagonism toward legislators. Common law was developed by
judges, and judges were - and are - professionals with solid, relia-
ble, well-educated backgrounds, persons generally part of the estab-
lished order and protective of its interests. While some legislators
shared the same origins and commitments, as a group they were quite
different. They represented a far more aggressive, economically far
less secure group than the judges. Indeed, part of the reason for the
distrust of legislators in the late nineteenth century was that they
were the most likely group to try and take it all away from the group
13. Hurst, supra note 1, at 26; Pound, supra note 12, at 121-125; Friedman, supra
note 4, at 18.
14. Friedman, supra note 4, at 489-91. See also supra note 5 and 10. For a
contemporary constitutional analysis of statutes regulating wages, see Myrick,
Statutory Regulation of Wages, 65 Central L.J. 468 (1907).
233 The Dalhousie Law Journal
at the top. 5
The sentiment against statutory law of the 1890's recognized a
unique characteristic of legislation - its capacity for making major
changes in the existing social order. Common law is private law.
Legislation opens the field of public law. 6 No judicial decision on a
work place injury can have as far-reaching effects as the legislative
establishment of a workers' compensation system. As noted, case law
is limited by the nature of the case that gave rise to the decision, and
even landmark cases will not have an impact beyond a fairly limited
legal field. The decision of a case may have significant and direct
impact on the law, but it is not likely to have any such direct impact
on the social order. ' 7 The legislation to establish workers' compensa-
15. For expressions of distrust of the qualifications of legislators, see Carter, supra
note 4, at 88-90; Griggs, supra note 7, at 5. For a somewhat later, 1907 comment on
legislation and legislators, see McLean, The Evolution of State Legislative Methods,
15 American Lawyer 78 (1907), in which the author notes that it needs "able men"
for legislation to become a "harmonious system of jurisprudence," that "the stupid
legislature has barely enough wit to provide a commission of able men" when an
important piece of industrial legislation is demanded; that "Of all the impotent
institutions that have found a place in free governments, our state legislatures are the
most stupid and venal." He recommends that 'The State Legislature as it now exists
should be abolished, and the duties of legislatures should be entrusted to a body of
men like the members of our supreme court." See also Pound, supra note 12, at
In commenting on judicial attitudes in the late nineteenth century, Friedman notes
that judicial hostility to legislation and particularly to social legislation was not
universal, but it was widespread and unpredictable:
"Judges, after all, were members of the same society as their litigants. They shared
the general outlook that American life was a zero-sum game, Their business was the
rule of law, legal tradition, adjudication. Legislation, whatever its subject, was a
threat to their primordial function, molding and declaring the law. Statutes were
brute intrusions, local in scope, often short sighted in principle or effect. Particularly
after 1870, judges may have seen themselves more and more as guardians of a
precious and threatened tradition. The clash of interests, the warfare of classes
brutally destroyed time-honored values. The judges read their constitutions as
instruments of caution, delay and honest doubt; they read them as instruments that
preserved historic truths, about democratic society and right reason; they read them
as middle-class texts, embodying middle-class values, striving toward middle-class
goals... Their taste for power was general, but the prejudices of the judges -
predominantly old-American, conservative, middle-class - dictated where the
effects of their power would fall."
Friedman, supra note 4, at 316-317.
16. Hurst, supra note 1, at 2-29. For an earlier expression of the relationship of
statutes to public law, see Carter, supra note 4, at 16-21.
17. Hurst, supra note 1, at 26; 0. Kraines, THE WORLD AND IDEAS OF
ERNST FREUND 25-27 (1974) (discussing E. Freund, STANDARDS OF AMER-
ICAN LEGISLATION (1917)).
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tion had an impact on employer-employee relations which was not
only different in degree, but different in kind from the impact of even
the most significant decisions in individual cases on employer liability
for workplace accidents. A case establishing a pharmacists' liability
for improperly labelling a medication, however influential in the law
of product liability, 8 is quite different in its impact from a compre-
hensive food and drug act, which sets labelling requirements
prospectively. ' 9
In recognizing the potential impact of legislation on society, the
legal establishment of the nineteenth century anticipated and paral-
leled the fears of later years as well. In the 1970's and 80's too, we
have been told that there is too much legislation and that it interferes
with industrial development and advances "big government" at
great cost to individual initiative and to a free economy. The capacity
of legislation to cause change has always troubled conservatives, and
the insistence that new legal and social problems can be dealt with by
the common law may generally be regarded as a polite way of urging
that nothing be done about the problems at all.
The turn of the century was a time of change. To be sure, there
were many expressions of hostility to legislation in legal publications
and by leading members of the bar,2" but there also began significant
efforts to collect and catalogue new laws passed by state legisla-
tures, 2' and bar association committees were formed to compile and
report on significant state legislative developments. 22 Moreover, the
development of legislation as a source of law was advanced during
that time by the professional contribution of a small number of
brilliant and visionary academics.
While conservative members of the profession were decrying the
excesses of legislation, such men as Roscoe Pound, Ernst Freund,
Joseph P. Chamberlain, James Landis, and later Dalhousie's Dean
Horace E. Read noted and described legisltive developments and
sought ways of advancing them. As early as 1908, Roscoe Pound, in
Common Law and Legislation described and criticized hostility to
18. Thomas and Wife v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
19. 21 U.S.C.A. §352.
20. See e.g., Griggs, supra note 7; Glasgow, supra note 9.
21. See e.g., Whitten, Trend of Legislation in the United States, New York State
Library Bulletin 399 (1900).
22. American Bar Association, Committee on Noteworthy Changes in Statute Law,
1915 Annual Report (1915).
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statutes. 23 Pound was an early supporter of the legislative develop-
ment of public law, and supported the codification movement.
Another contemporary critic of the emphasis on case method
teaching, and one of the important early contributors to the literature
of modern law-making and legislative research and drafting was
Ernst Freund. In his book on Standards of American Legislation,
24
published in 1917, he set forth a number of concrete proposals for the
development, and the improvement of the quality of legislation.
One of the major interests of Ernst Freund was the analysis of the
increasing interaction between the legislature and the executive - in
the form of developing administrative agencies. This interest was
shared by others in the early part of the twentieth century, and
became a most active one, clearly, during the 1930's, following the
beginning of the New Deal era.2 5 Some of this pervasive interest of
the time is reflected in the writings of Joseph P. Chamberlain, 26 who,
in 1911, founded the Legislative Drafting Research Fund at Colum-
bia Law School, laying the groundwork for the first course in legisla-
23. Pound, supra note 5, at 383-85. Pound's contributions to jurisprudence, and his
contribution to what he called "sociological jurisprudence" require little documenta-
tion. Throughout his long career, he strongly supported codification. Pound, The
Advisability of Codifying Anglo-American Law, in R. Pound, 3 JURISPRUDENCE,
732-738 (1959); Pound, Sources and Forms of Law, 22 Notre Dame Lawyer, 1,
71-79 (1946).
24. E. Freund, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION (1917). The work
focussed largely on the obstacles created for legislation by narrow and unreasonable
interpretation of due process and other constitutional protections. He strongly sup-
ported codification, the development of public law through legislation, and the
development of administrative delegation. See also E. Freund, The Problem of
Intelligent Legislation, Proceedings of the American Political Science Association at
Its Fourth Annual Meeting held at Madison, Wisconsin, December 27-31, 1907,
Vol. IV, 1907, pp. 69-79 (The Waverly Press, 1908). See discussion in Kraines,
supra note 17 at 25-27.
25. Felix Frankfurter gave recognition to the modern development of Administra-
tive Law and advanced notice of its New Deal expansion in The Task of Administra-
tive Law, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 614 (1927) in which he also paid tribute to the
contributions of Ernest Freund at Harvard and Frank J. Goodman at Columbia.
For a significant historical review of the development of Administrative Law, before
and after the New Deal, see K.C. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 1.04,
Historical Development (3rd ed. 1972), and W. Gellhorn, Changing Attitudes
Toward the Administrative Process, in INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND
GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 3-22 (1956).
26. Among his numerous works on aspects of legislation, Professor Chamberlain's
book on THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES (1942), and his earlier LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: NATIONAL AND
STATE deserve special mention. Both of these works are cited frequently still and
continue as significant contributions.
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tion at any American Law School, providing the impetus which led
to the establishment of the Congressional drafting services, the Offi-
ces of the House and Senate Legislative Counsel, and establishing the
first, oldest and still ongoing University-connected "clinical" insti-
tute in legislative research and drafting, employing and teaching law
students in the requisite skills.
27
Your own Dean Horace E. Read also recognized the need for
professional teaching in legislation and in the professional skills
necessary to advance the cause of sound and responsible law-mak-
ing. 28 As the need for responsive legislation grows, and as the solu-
tion of more complex problems demands more informed and skillful
legislation, legal education will have to respond more vigorously, and
in an intellectually generous manner.
III. Efforts to Rescue the Common Law; Law Revision Commissions
andRestatements
The ascendancy of legislation in the twentieth century was marked
by several efforts to repair the common law to enable it to cope with
new problems. These efforts, which began in the 1920's, included the
creation of a number of law revision commissions, starting with the
New York Commision, established in 1934, and the American Law
Institute Restatement movement.
The first of the law revision commissions is historically the most
interesting. Its beginnings can be traced back to an article in the 1921
Harvard Law Review by Benjamin Cardozo, who was one of New
27. See THE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1911-1971: A BRIEF HISTORY
OF THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS (1972). This publication, prepared by the Director
on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the Fund, incorporates the earlier
account by Professor John M. Kernochan, A University Service to Legislation:
Columbia's Legislative Drafting Research Fund, 16 La. L. Rev. 633 (1956). On the
origins of the Offices of House and Senate Legislative Counsel, see F. Lee, The
Office of Legislative Counsel, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 381 (1929). See also Middleton
Beaman: Doctor of Laws, 35 A.B.A.J. 778 (1940).
28. Among the many contributions of Dean Read was the authorship, together with
John W. MacDonald, of the first edition of the leading coursebook on legislation.
Now in its fourth edition, Read, MacDonald, Fordham and Pierce, MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION still retains its place as the standard teaching tool in its field,
setting a standard of excellence, breadth of scope and depth of insight for later
works. Dean Read's work in establishing the Nova Scotia Legislative Research
Centre, and his development of such a Centre at the Minneapolis Law School as part
of his legislation course there, have stimulated similar efforts at other law schools.
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York's great common law judges before he joined the U.S. Supreme
Court. The article, A Ministry of Justice29 dealt with issues in the
administration of justice, and particularly with the lack of communi-
cation between the courts and the legislature. "Courts and legisla-
tures work in separation and aloofness," 3" he wrote. The result of this
"proud and silent isolation"'" was an inability to deal effectively
with anachronisms and defects which had developed in the law. On
the one hand, the process of judge-made law, and more particularly
stare decisis, severely inhibited the ability of the courts to escape an
impasse in the course of justice; both the difficulty of breaking with
long-established precedent and the decreased role of judicial creativi-
ty in the face of ever-increasing statutory solutions contributed to the
view that the legislature was the "chief hope of law reform." 32 On
the other hand, the legislature was equally incapable of effecting
useful law reform in the field of private law, because the information
upon which it was to act was simply insufficient, in his view, to
perform the job satisfactorily. As Cardozo observed:
... the legislature, informed only casually and intermittently of
the needs and problems of the courts, without expert or responsi-
bile or disinterested or systematic advice as to the workings of one
rule or another, patches the fabric here and there and mars often
when it would mend.33
A new agency was therefore required to assure adequate and
impartial communication between the courts and the legislature.
"This task of mediation is that of a ministry of justice." 34 Citing the
views of other noted legal scholars, both American and European,
Cardozo saw the function of such a group as to observe the private
law in operation and to report to the legislature such changes as are
necessary when this operation is deranged. The cure would not be a
code, which Cardozo viewed as a "slow and toilsome process." 35
Rather, what was needed was simply a change in direction, a break
in the logic of stare decisis, to free judges from anachronisms and
29. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113 (1921).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 114.
32. Report of the Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York State,
Leg. Doc. No. 50 at 51 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Main Report].
33. Cardozo, supra note 29, at 113-14.
34. Id. at 114.
35. Id. at 117.
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defects in judge-made law. "Often a dozen lines or less will be
enough... "36
Cardozo explained the function of a ministry of justice by analogy.
He expressed amazement that the fields of private law37 did not have
a caretaker similar to the Attorney General with respect to Work-
man's Compensation Law. When a defect occurs in the operation of
this law, the Attorney General immediately presents a case for
amendment to the legislature. Thus, it is this "public officer, whose
duty prompts him to criticism and action,"3 which Judge Cardozo
felt lacking in the fields of private law. Perhaps it should be added
that this model system was abandoned long ago.
The "Ministry of Justice," named New York Law Revision Com-
mission, was established following the report of a Commission on the
Administration of Justice, created earlier by the legislature.39 The
Law Revision Commission proposal was supported by the Commis-
sion, which, however, expressed doubts "whether law schools and
other educational institutions [would] be able to carry on research
which has a practical utility in the training of lawyers." 4 0 This con-
cern stemmed from the unanimous view that a true ministry of justice
would require contributions from law faculty and students, because
its function would be primarily one of research. Another concern, in
1930, was whether the state could afford to fund an agency whose
work might take years to produce, or might never become effective,
either because in the interim other events would relieve the problem,
or because the legislature rejected the proposed solution."
The final report on the proposal for a Law Revision was presented
to the Legislature in 1934. It emphasized the critical role of the
legislature in the process of reform:
We rely upon legislation to meet new conditions, and to correct
existing evils, Courts may play a part in these processes by inter-
36. Id.
37. In Judge Cardozo's view, "private law" was to be distinguished from his exam-
ple of Workmen's Compensation in that the former deals only with the distribution
of justice "between man and man." Id.
38. Id.
39. Act of April 23, 1930, ch. 727, 1930 N.Y. Laws 1326 (continued by amend-
ment in 1931, 1932, and twice in 1933). Preliminary Report of the Commission on
the Administration of Justice in New York State, Leg. Doc. No. 92 (1932) [herei-
nafter cited as Preliminary Report].
40. Id. at 26.
41. Id. at 26.
239 The Dalhousie Law Journal
pretation of statutes and by development of the Common Law,
but still their function is essentially the administration of law and
not its making.4 2
The report on the proposal for a Law Review Commission stressed
the need for a commission to devote itself to the revision of the field
of private law.
The Legislature enacted the bill establishing the first Law Revision
Commission in the nation in 1934. The purposes of the Commission
were set out as follows:
1. To examine the common law and statutes of the state and
current judicial decisions for the purpose of discovering defects and
anachronisms in the law and recommending needed reforms.
2. To receive and consider proposed changes in the law recom-
mended by the American Law Institute, the commissioners for the
promotion of uniformity of legislation in the United States, any
bar association or other learned bodies.
3. To receive and consider suggestions from judges, justices, pub-
lic officials, lawyers and the public generally as to defects and
anachronisms in the law.
4. To recommend, from time to time, such changes in the law as
it deems necessary to modify or eliminate antiquated and inequit-
able rules of law, and to bring the law of this state, civil and
criminal, into harmony with modern conditions.
5. To report its proceedings annually to the legislature... and, if
it deems advisable, to accompany its report with proposed bills to
carry out any of its recommendations."
The New York Law Revision Commission released its first report
in 1935. 44 It shows that the Commission remained true to its man-
date of improving the common law. It examined the decisions of
New York's highest court "for the purpose of disclosing cases in
which the Court exhibited a reluctance to follow precedent." 45 In its
first report, the Commission noted that "A survey of the working of
existing rules of law is an essential part of this program as a continu-
ing body serving the Legislature in an advisory capac-
ity .... 46 The Commissions' recommendations have all been legisla-
42. Main report, supra note 32, at 53.
43. N.Y. Legis. Law §72 (Consol. 1979).
44. Report of the Law Revision Commission, Leg. Doc. No. 60 (1935) [hereinafter
cited as First Report].
45. Id.
46. Id. at.15.
The Ascendancy of Legislation 240
tive recommendations, relying on the legislature to provide a quick
fix for problems which the common law had failed to resolve. The
recommendations - with one exception - have never consisted of
substantial codifications, nor of substantial proposals for the syste-
matic reform of an entire substantive area, nor the development of
new programs. The one exception was the study, commencing in
1953, of the Uniform Commercial Code. The record of the Law
Revision Commission shows that it focussed on private law, common
law, problems, including such matters as the attribution of a parent's
negligence to an infant too young to be capable of such negligence 4 7,
the abolition of the rule that a cause of action for personal injuries
was lost if either the plaintiff or the defendant died before
judgement4 8 ; the abolition of the rule of the denial of recovery for
prenatal injuries, and for provisions limiting the significance of the
seal in written contracts. 49 All of these were worthwhile patches on
the fabric of the common law, and the account of the New York Law
Revision Commission's first thirty years shows other examples," ° but
during that same period, from 1934 to 1955, the Federal Congress
had enacted the Social Security Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act,
the Securities Exchange Act, and the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, to mention just a few.
The New York Law Revision Commission was the first. Some
other States eventually followed suit.I' The other most populous state
in the United States did not establish its Law Revision Commission
until 1953.52 Relying on the successful New York experience of near-
ly twenty years, the California law used almost identical language in
setting out the purposes of California's commission. But twenty years
47. Leg. Doc. No. 60(c) (1935) (Recommendation and Study made in relation to
Imputation of Negligence to Infants).
48. Drabner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220 (1921).
49. Id.; First Report, supra note 44, at 13.
50. MacDonald, J. Legal Research Translated into Legislative Action; The New
York Law Revision Commission, 1934-1963, 48 Cornell L. Q. 401 (1963). The
author had a long association with the Commission, including a long term as its
Executive Secretary and Director of Research, 1934-56, as a Commissioner from
1956, and he became its Chairman in 1958. He was also one of the authors of the
coursebook on Legislation, Fordham, Read and MacDonald, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1959).
51. E.g., Florida, established 1967; Illinois, established 1951; Michigan, established
1965; New Jersey, established 1951.
52. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 10300 - 10340 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984).
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later the language had assumed different implications, because Cali-
fornia has dealt almost exclusively with statutory problems,53 focuss-
ing primarily on procedural issues.54 It seems that the fifties saw a
somewhat similar change of direction in New York as well, reflect-
ing, perhaps, a turning away from common law priorities.
The reference in the New York Law Revision Commission statute
to work emanating form the American Law Institute is more than
fortuitous. It demonstrates that the need to rescue the common law
was widely recognized. The efforts to authorize the establishment of
the Law Revision Commission were contemporaneous with efforts to
establish the American Law Institute, and some leaders of the bar
were involved in both causes:
In the early years, the notion of an American Law Institute and of
a Restatement of the Law were synonymous. The original proposal
dates back to the 1914 Report of the Association of American Law
Schools, in which appeared papers submitted by Professors Hohfeld
of Yale and Beale of Harvard, suggesting a reexamination of the law,
for purposes of readjustment and necessary reform.55 The War inter-
vened and the suggestion was not revived until 1921-22, when a
"Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for
the Improvement of the Law" was formed, chaired by Elihu Root
and consisting of a number of distinguished members of the Bar,
judges and law teachers. The Committee's report led to the meeting
on February 23, 1923 at which the American Law Institute was
founded. The reports of the Committee which led to the formation of
the Institute express the sense that the common law was in trouble, its
rules complex, its terms uncertain, and its development unsys temat-
ic.56 There was a sense that the problem was acute, undermining
public confidence in the rule of law and confusing even able practi-
tioners.5 7 The Restatement movement, Professor Yntema noted, had
two sources, "the academic theory that the common law is a body of
53. In the reports of its first three years, contained in one volume, the Commission
covered not a single common law issue.
54. See, e.g., Cal. Law Comm., Rec. and Study relating to Retention of Venue for
Convenience of Witnesses (February 1, 1957); Rec. and Study relating to Bringing
New Parties into Civil Action (February 21, 1957).
55. 1914 Proceedings of the American Association of Law Schools, at 31, 34
(Joseph H. Beale); at 76, 137 (Wesley N. Hohfeld).
56. Report to the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for
the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law
Institute (1923) (hereinafter cited as Root Comm. Rpt.), at 1,8.
57. Id. at 1.
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scientific principle and the very practical demand of the Bar for
greater simplicity and uniformity in the enormous mass of the sources
of American Law."
58
There was substantial agreement that the work of the ALI was to
simplify, clarify and make changes to adopt the law to life, and to
distill from it the "body of scientific principles which has been adapt-
ed in each of the common law jurisdictions in this country, as the
basis of its law."
59
It has been noted that the notion of the common law as a body of
scientific principles accorded nicely with the principles of stare decisis
and the doctrine of judicial supremacy, and with the need for uni-
formity among jurisdictions. It also agreed nicely with the case law
emphasis of American law schools dominant since Professor Lang-
dell's days in Harvard.
60
The early history of the ALl and the Restatement movement also
make it abundantly clear that the purpose was to preserve the com-
mon law - to give a role to lawyers in saving their law, in the areas
of their special expertise ,6 an expertise which was viewed as separate
and distinct from that of the legislature. 62 Indeed, it is clear that
statutory law, legislation, was to remain outside the scope of the
Restatement, 63 and at most, the ALI was to concern itself with the
form in which public law was expressed, and not with its substance.
The role of the ALl was not to promote - or obstruct - political,
social or economic change, but simply "to enable the legal profes-
sion... to carry out its public obligation to improve the law." 64 The
law to improve was, of course, the common law.
There was explicit agreement that even though changes in the law
might have broader policy implications of a political, economic or
social nature, the Restatements should not consider "Changes in the
law which are, or which would, if proposed, become a matter of great
public concern and discussion .... "65
58. Yntema, "The American Law Institute," Legal Essays in Tribute of Orrin Kip
McMurray, at 671 (1935).
59. Beale Report, quoted in Yntema, supra at 658.
60. Yntema, supra, at 659.
61. Root Comm. Rpt. at 4; An Account of the Proceedings at the Organization of
the Institute in Washington D.C., on February 23, 1923 (1923) (hereinafter cited as
1923 Proceedings) at 81.
62. 1923 Proceedings at 40, 41.
63. Root Comm. Rpt. at 4, 29, 41.
64. Id. at 41.
65. 1923 Proceedings at 15.
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"The Institute must not only ascertain what the law is but what it
ought to be, bearing in mind that the changes advocated should be
confined to those designed to carry out policies which are general-
ly admitted to be desirable and which do not touch subjects of
general public controversy. "66
The Restatement not only sought to stay away from contentious
issues more appropriate to legislatures, perhaps, but the ALI was also
clear that the Restatements were not intended as a codification of the
law. While there was an assertion that the Restatements would stand
alongside the Codes of Justinian and Napoleon as the third great
attempt in history to state the law, 6 7 unlike these earlier efforts, the
Restatements were not envisaged as statutes, even though the first set
of Restatements, published 'ithout supporting citation or research or
other supporting material, looked uncomfortably similar to statutes.
The initial committee chaired by Elihu Root had warned against
drafting the Restatements in statute-like form. Such an approach was
unwise in the Committee's view, because it would reflect a lack of
flexibility inimical to the common law. 68 The general hostility of
early Restatement proponents to legislation is reflected in a number
of comments,69 though other views should be noted. Dean (later
Justice) Stone indicated that the Restatements would move in the
direction of reform, "without waiting for the sporadic and unrelated
enactments of the legislature." 7 Stone did recognize that with the
Restatements the ALI was indeed performing a quasi-legislative task.
While he had serious doubts about codification, 7 he believed that
some sort of legislative approval would assure the attention of the
courts. He proposed that state legislatures adopt the Restatements
not as laws but as statements of principle, allowing the courts "to
accept and follow any of the precepts in the Restatements when they
conflict with precedents but without making such action mandato-
ry.''72 However, Stone's proposal was not adopted - nor was it
66. Root Comm. Rpt. at 55, 56.
67. 1923 Proceedings at 93 (Speech of Gov. Hadley); Honorable Jefferson B.
Brown, The ALI: Its Organization and Purposes, 1923 Address to the Sixteenth
Annual Meeting of the Florida State Bar Association (1923) at 16.
68. Root Comm. Rpt. at 19.
69. 1923 Proceedings at 90.
70. Harlan Fiske Stone, Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification, 23
Colum. L. Rev. 319, 336-37 (1923).
71. Id. at 329-30.
72. H. Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A.J. 147, 335 (1969).
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rejected - by Root's Committee. Cardozo, in 1921, expressed doubt
about the support ALl would get if it moved in the direction of
codification,73 but in 1931 Williston expressed has belief that a code
would evolve, and that the Restatement would "serve as a better
foundation for a code, if one should be needed, than any country has
had before.
' 74
The American Law Institute's Restatement efforts beginning in the
1920's form a significant chapter in the ascendancy of legislation.
Clearly conceived as an institute to help salvage the common law, the
American Law Institute developed its excellent Restatements with
the aid of the foremost experts in the nation, and, as time went on,
seemed to be increasingly less sure whether the Restatements were a
source of law, a reflection of the best of the existing common law, or
a projection of what (code-like?) the common law ought to be.
Whatever the Restatements have achieved, they have not aided
the common law by reducing the number of its authoritative sources.
In addition to the usual case law authorities, courts now cite the
Restatement, and in some instances both the Restatement and the
Restatement (Second). In the case of strict liability for certain risky
activities such as the disposal of hazardous waste, an area in which I
have recently worked, courts quite commonly cite Rylands v.
Fletcher, the state's cases which have followed Rylands v. Fletcher,
followed by the first Restatement analysis of what constitutes
"ultrahazardous activity," followed by reference to the definition of
"abnormally dangerous" activities in Restatement (Second). Finally,
and not uncommonly, the court, having stirred the doctrines tho-
roughly, will render a decision without indicating which doctrine it
has selected as its basis for decision.75.
It is part of the story of the ascendancy of legislation that the
American Law Institute began to change its course around the time
when Professor Herbert Wechsler became the Reporter for the Model
73. Benjamin Cardozo, Address to the Association of American Law Schools at the
Annual Meeting in 1921, at 118 (1923).
74. S. Williston, Written and Unwritten Law, 17 A.B.A.J. 39, 41 (1923).
75. For comment on the multiplicity of sources problem in the specific area of strict
liability, see Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group, INJURIES AND DAMAGES
FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES - ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF
LEGAL REMEDIES, A Report to Congress in Compliance with Section 301(e) of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (P.L. 96-510), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (September 1982), Serial No. 97-12. See
discussion of Strict Liability, at 95-109. The author was a member and the Reporter
of the Study Group.
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Penal Code in 1960. Today, in 1984, the ALl still does Restatements,
but it has increasingly turned its attention to model codes, such as the
Model Penal Code, the Federal Income Tax Project, and even to
codes that reflect substantial private law interests such as the Model
Land Development Code.76
IV. Changes in Attitudes of Statutory Construction
Roscoe Pound, writing in 1908 gave an exhaustive listing of the
various ways in which courts could act in dealing with legislation,
ranging from ignoring it altogether to giving it full scope, treating it
as a source of law for all purposes. 7" Pound noted that considerable
progress had been made, though some courts still seemed to take
pride in construing statutes out of existence.7" The courts' tolerance
of statutes has improved since then, though progress has been inter-
mittent and not continuous. While occasional relapses may be noted,
courts today rarely engage in the cat-and-mouse game of interpreting
legislation in such a way as to frustrate its main purpose. Courts no
longer do this because, in most cases they cannot, even if they want-
ed to. It would be difficult to interpret major programmatic legisla-
tion - such as the Social Security Law,79 the Clean Air Act 80 or the
76. The change of direction began in 1948-49, when Judge Learned Hand chaired a
committee to take stock and look to the future of ALI on the occasion of its
twenty-fifth anniversary. The report reflected the recognition of the increased role of
model legislation. By 1981 Judge Hand considered model codes to be the most
important aspect of the work of the ALl. Professor Herbert Wechsler has strongly
emphasized the role of legislative reform of the law during his directorship of the
ALI. See J. Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A.J. 147, 148
(1969), and Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in the Restatement
Work of the ALl, 13 St. Louis U. L. J. 186-7 (1969).
77. Pound, supra, note 5, at 385-6.
78. See, e.g., Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co. 196 U.S. 1, 25 S. Ct. 158, 49 L. Ed.
363 (1904) reversing the Court of Appeals which had totally emasculated an Act of
Congress "To Promote the Safety of Employees and Travellers Upon Rail Roads by
Compelling Common Carriers Engaged in Interstate Commerce to Equip their Cars
with Automatic Couplers and Continuous Brakes .. " after hundreds of railroad
workers had been killed or maimed in the absence of such equipment, The Circuit
Court applied the most limited of constructions because the law was in derogation of
common law assumption of risk rules, and because the law was regarded as penal
since it had a penalty for violations. The Supreme Court, in reversing, said: "We are
unable to accept these conclusions, notwithstanding the able opinion of the majori-
ty, as they appear to us to be inconsistent with the plain intention of Congress, to
defeat the object of the legislation, and to be arrived at by an inadmissible narrow-
ness of construction."
79. 42U.S.C.A. §§301-1397 (f).
80. CAA §§101-406, 42U.S.C.A. §§7401-7642.
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Black Lung Act,8 in this hostile fashion because their main purposes
are explicit, and though "strict construction" may reduce their full
effectiveness, their main thrust is difficult to avoid.
The late 19th Century technique of hostile statutory interpretation,
requiring great specificity in the wording of laws, particularly in the
case of statutes in derogation of the common law, has left its mark on
the field of legislative drafting. While the civil law countries were
developing a drafting style which was generic and expansive,82
draftsmen in common law countries were obliged to anticipate hostile
interpretations, and to make their drafts narrowly specific. This tight,
cramped draftsmanship resulted in statutes which had to be lengthy,
prolix and fussy, full of minute and express inclusions, exceptions and
provisos, if they were to cover more than a very narrow field. To
make sure that the draft would successfully hit the target, the draft
had to forego including any peripheral or analogous areas. The herit-
age of the past is still with us - our drafting style has not recovered
from its late nineteenth century efforts to stave off judicial nullifica-
tion by compulsive attention to detail, and by never relying on the
pronouncement of broad legislative mandates.83
Though courts in the 1980's generally do not approach statutes
with outright hostility, their degree of acceptance differs. The federal
courts in the United States live easily with statutory law. This is not
surprising because there is very little federal common law, and they
deal with common law only in diversity of jurisdiction cases when
state law is applied. The federal courts have dealt almost exclusively
with statutory issues, and, with the usual number of exceptions, have
managed well with problems of interpretation. They seem to have
81. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 30 U.S.C.A.
§§801 et seq..
82. R. Schlesinger, COMPARATIVE LAW: THE CODE SYSTEM 174-198
(1959). See also, R. David and H. deVries, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM
12-15 (1958) commenting on the drafting of the Code Napoleon as code writing of
universal application - i.e., the exposition of principles and rules good for the ages.
83. See, e.g., Anton, Legislation and Its Limits, 5 Dalhousie L. J. 233, 241-242
(1979); Glendon, The Sources of Law in a Changing Legal Order, 17 Creighton L.
Rev. 663, 669 (1984). But see Hammond, Embedding Policy Statements in Statutes:
A Comparative Perspective on the Genesis of a New Public Law Jurisprudence, 5
Hastings Int. & Comp. L. Rev. 323 (1981), on the increased reliance on broad
policy statements in recent legislation in the U.S., Canada and Great Britain.
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overcome the strictures of the plain meaning rule, 4 and they no
longer balk at the use of extrinsic sources.85 The nature of the statutes
they have had to deal with has also changed; these statutes form the
core of the programmatic legislation which characterizes the legisla-
tion of our time.
86
One test of the degree of judicial resistance to statutes is the
reliance on the rule of strict construction of statutes in derogation of
the common law. In the federal courts, there have been very few
instances of reliance on the doctrine, and hardly any in the past
twenty years, except in state diversity cases when the federal court
relied on the rule applied in a particular state. In the case of Falwell v.
Penthouse International,87 a federal district court found that the
Reverend Falwell had not met the requirements of a Virginia inva-
sion of privacy statute:
Virginia has never recognized a common law cause of action for
invasion of privacy. Because the Virginia statute is in derogation
of the common law, it must be strictly construed.88
In the state courts, the doctrine is more heavily relied on - or
cited - in some, rejected in other, and regarded as one of several
canons of construction in a third group of states.89 The rejection or
abandonment of the doctrine was the result of legislation, rather than
court decision, in California,9" Idaho, 9' Pennsylvania 92 and Texas. 93
84. There are complaints of specific failures of interpretation, but there seem to be
no complaints of the courts' general attitude to statutes. See A. Murphy, OldMaxims
Never Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern"
Federal Courts, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1299 (1975). The particular instance of the
interpretational outrage was reversed by the Supreme Court. Train v. Colorado
Public Interest Research Group, Inc. 426 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 1938, 48 L. Ed. 2d 434
(1976).
85. See, generally, J. Kernochan, Statutory Interpretations: An Outline of Method,
3 Dalhousie L.J. 333 (1976).
86. See infra, text at note 109 et seq. See also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976); Hammond, supra note 83 at
326-7.
87. 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981).
88. Id. at 1210.
89. This analysis resulted from reviewing 373 cases decided by the highest state
courts, and some 88 federal cases obtained through a LEXIS search.
90. Cal. Civ. §4 (West 1982).
91. Idaho Code §73-102(1) (Supp. 1982).
92. Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Tit. 1, § 1928 (Purdon Supp. 1982-83).
93. Tex. Civ. Code Ann. Art. 10(8) (Vernon 1969).
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The Idaho statute is an example:
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are
to be strictly construed, has no application to these compiled laws.
The compiled laws.., are to be liberally construed, with a view to
effect their objects and to promote justice.94
(There is a question, of course, whether the Idaho statute, being in
derogation of the common law, should not be strictly construed. The
courts have not entertained this question, and have fully accepted the
new legislative direction!)
New York, which has no statutory provision on the subject, has
placed limited reliance on the statutes-in-derogation doctrine. A not-
able 1982 Court of Appeals decision relating to construction of a
statute allowing the admission of a lost will to probate mentioned the
doctrine but did not appear to rely on it exclusively.95
A few states still place considerable reliance on the doctrine, even
though there have only been a few cases of this kind in recent years.
A 1978 Illinois case,9 6 which involved the tort liability of public
utilities, relied on the doctrine, and the highest court of the state
states the doctrine, sparing none of its implications:
The rule of Illinois is that statutes in derogation of the common
law are to be strictly construed in favor of the person sought to be
subjected to their operation. The courts will read nothing into such
statutes by intendment or implication.
97
A third category of states appear to place some reliance on the
doctrine. These states, standing midway between the rejection and
strong reliance position, evidence a range of application. Some mere-
ly pay lip service and use it as a make-weight, 98 while others may rely
on it as one of several significant reasons for decicion. 9
Some examples are worth noting for their special treatment of the
strict construction doctrine. One such case is Wis. Bankers Ass'n. v.
Mutal Sav. & Loan Ass'n.. "' The decision is noteworthy because it
sets out explicit guidelines for application of the strict construction
doctrine. The court was asked to decide the validity of a hybrid bank
account under the state's savings and loan statutes. Relying on
94. Idaho Code §73-102(1) (Supp. 1982).
95. Matter of Kleefeld, 55 N.Y.2d 253,433 N.E.2d 521, 448 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1982).
96. Barthel v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co., 74 Il.2d 213, 84 N.E.2d 323 (1978).
97. 74 I1.2d at 220.
98. See e.g., McNealv.Allen, 95 Wash.2d 265, 621 P.2d 1285 (1980).
99. See e.g., Roe v. Lewis, 416 So.2d 750 (Ala. 1982).
100. 96 Wis.2d 438,291 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
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secondary sources, the court set forth the following framework:
For the rule to apply, (1) there must be a common law doctrine in
existence, or potentially in existence relevant to the issue presented
by the parties; (2) the statute in issue must be one which,
construed as the party pleading it contented, would operate to
change the common law; (3) the statute must be ambiguous on its
face. These three shown, a court was then warranted in proceeding
to interpret the statute narrowly, to have as little effect as possible
in altering the common law. 10 '
Oddly enough, the case did not rely on the strict construction doc-
trine, since the court found no clear common law rule which would
be transgressed by statute.
A Delaware case, Colonial Sch. Bd. v. Colonial Affiliate, Etc. 102
sets forth a theoretical justification for the strict construction doc-
trine. In Colonial, the court narrowly construed a statute which
authorized the school boards to engage in collective bargaining, lim-
iting the permissible subjects of such negotiation to those expressly
enumerated in the statute. In so doing, the court placed about equal
emphasis on the strict construction doctrine and the legislative intent.
Moreover, the court suggested that the reason the doctrine was "axi-
omatic," was that
the General Assembly is presumed to have been aware of two
facets of existing law when it enacted The Professional Negotia-
tions and Relations Law in 1969:
First, at common law, public employees had no right to collec-
tively bargain. .. 03
In other words, the statute should be strictly construed as in deroga-
tion of the common law because the enacting legislature is charged
with knowledge of the common law. Thus, a clear intent to override
the comon law would be necessary to make the canon inapplicable.
One last case worth taking note of here because it demonstrates
the interaction of the strict construction doctrine with another prin-
ciple of statutory construction - the canon that remedial statutes
should be liberally construed. In Albuquerque Hilton Inn v. Haley, '04
the Suprme Court of New Mexico found both doctrine applicable.
There the issue before the court was whether a statute limiting a
101. 291 N.W.2d at 877. The court relied on Page, Statutes in Derogation of
Common Law: The Canon as an Analytical Tool, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 78, 87.
102. Dela., supra, 449 A.2d 243 (1982).
103. Id. at 247.
104. 90 N.M. 510, 565 P.2d 1027 (1977).
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hotelkeeper's liability applied in a case where luggage was lost not in,
but on the way to the hotel. The court acknowledged the force of the
strict construction doctrine, but went on:
However, this statute was obviously enacted to ameliorate the
effect of the harsh common law rule, and as a remedial statute in
derogation of the common law a different rule applies.
The proper analysis in the case where a statute is both remedial and
in derogation of the common law, said the court, was to "construe
strictly the question of whether it does modify the common law, but
its application should be liberally construed." 10 5 The court went on to
find the statute applicable under the circumstances, and the hotel
keeper was held liable for the loss of luggage in transit.
Judicial treatment of statutes in derogation of the common law
shows that in some courts, the restrictive attitudes to legislation per-
sist to some degree. Nationwide, in the U.S., there has been signifi-
cant improvement.
The acceptance of legislation, as noted before, has not progressed
in a straight and continuous line. There is not, as yet, full acceptance
of statutes as a source of law by analogy, in cases beyond their
specific terms, though there, too, progress has been made. 0 6 But
there have also been setbacks. Just a few years ago, the courts would
find an implied right of private action for damages when the plaintiff
had been injured by the violation of a statute intended to protect the
group or interest to which he belonged. In the leading case of Cort v.
Ash, 107 for instance, such an implied private right action was recog-
nized and criteria were articulated for its application, though the
statute did not expressly authorize such private causes of action. In a
number of cases in the past few years the U.S. Supreme Court has
effectively put a stop to this development, though it has never said so
105. 90 N.M. at 512, 565 P.2d at 1029.
106. For a recent analysis and account of some progress, see Williams, R. Statutes
As Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common Law Cases, 50 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 554 (1982). For an early treatment of the subject, see R. Pound, supra note 4 at
385-86; and J. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS 213 (1934). Also note comments on the judicial failure to use statutes in
this manner by H.F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L.
Rev. 4 (1936).
107. 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080, 45 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1975). The court developed a
four-step test for the availability of implied civil remedies. For an early grant of such
remedies, see Texas Pacific Railway Co. v.Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 482, 60 L.
Ed. 874 (1916).
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expressly.108 Those of us who have confidence in legislation as a
source of law must see to it that the statutes say it clearly - and say
it all.
V. The Development and Prevalence of Programmatic Legislation
The significant change in the twentieth century is in the character of
the laws. The dominant form of legislation today, starting with the
New Deal legislation of the thirties, is what I shall call programmatic
legislation. It is a new form which responds to new needs. During
much of the nineteenth century, legislation had limited targets, and
much state legislation was of a limited remedial nature - to remedy
problems of private law which common law decisions had created, or
which common law decisional approaches were unable or unwilling
to resolve. A great deal of that legislation, it appears, dealt with
matters that could have been resolved by decisional law if an approp-
riate case for such a decision had emerged, or if, having emerged, the
courts had been willing to create new case law for the future. There
was also a great deal of private, local, and special legislation, and
there was very little public law, and even less legislation that created
any public programs. 09
Programmatic legislation is precisely the kind of legislation the
eighteen nineties would have been afraid of. It consists of public law
that cannot be formulated or promulgated by the courts. In essence,
programmatic legislation creates a governmental program - its usu-
108. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 60 L. Ed. 2d
560 (1979); La Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 61
L. Ed. 2d 82 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,
100 S. Ct. 242, 62 L. E d. 2d 146 (1979);Middlesex County Sewage Authority v.
National Sea Clammers Association, 435 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981). See also,
Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation In
the Supreme Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 892 (1982), which notes a current trend
toward literalist statutory construction by the U.S. Supreme Court.
109. See Hurst, supra note I at 9-10, commenting on the limited scope of general
legislation during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century. See also Mowry,
The Growing Complexities of Legislation, 40 American Law Rev. 212, 68 Albany
L.J. 112, (1906) which criticized the growth of narrow, local legislation in state
legislatures, blamed local political machines'for this growth, and proposed procedu-
ral reform. See also Address of Honorable Moorefield Storey, 53 Albany L.J. 117
(1896), which supported the need for special legislation. There was beginning
reliance on legislation in the last quarter of the nineteenth century some of which
produced the strong opposition referred to earlier. Friedham, supra note 4 at
311-318.
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al patterns is the establishment or designation of an agency, and the
assignment of a task. Frequently, the task is broadly defined, leaving
the agency with the obligation to articulate the details of its own
mandate. I I0 The breadth of the delegation grows out of the complexi-
ty of the assigned task. If the statute is to provide substantial schemes
of social insurance, or sound regulation of hazardous or toxic pollu-
tants, or decent controls on the distribution of sophisticated medical
technology, it must delegate the details of eligibility requirements,
technical details of health and safety requirements, or details of eco-
nomic controls over scarce medical resources to agencies that have
been provided with the means and expertise to carry out their legisla-
tively defined task. It should be added that programmatic legislation
uses the tools of administrative law because it must."' Administra-
tive law, which has many other applications, does not, however,
define the field of programmatic legislation.
Other recurring aspects of programmatic legislation may be noted.
Generally, in establishing a new program, the legislature seeks to
occupy the entire field it regulates, leaving no room for other law-
making in the area. 2 This feature of programmatic legislation has
resulted in formidable, lengthy, detailed and complex statutes,
because it usually takes a lot of law to cover a field. The development
of good programmatic legislation requires a thorough knowledge of
110. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), where Skelly
Wright, J. reviewed the highly technical evidence supporting new lead additive
regulations under the Clean Air Act, and commented that in assessing risks to public
health in setting the standard, the Administration was called upon to make "essen-
tial legislative policy judgements..." (at 26).
111. See Friedham, supra note 4 at 590 recounting the effect of the New Deal on
the development of administrative agencies and administrative law. He notes, too,
that although the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 is taken
as something of a beginning of administrative law, in fact there had been many
administrative agencies on the state and federal level before then "The administra-
tive agency was a child of necessity. Big government and positive government meant
a government which divided its labor among specialists and specialized bodies." Id.
at 384. See also K.C. Davis, supra note 25, at § 1.02.
112. The point is illustrated in an unusual context. In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 68 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1981), the Court held that in the
total rewriting and restructuring of the earlier, far more lenient water pollution
control act, Congress had fully occupied the field, and that the comprehensiveness of
the Clean Water Act left no room for reliance on the federal common law of
nuisance recognized earlier. Compare Estreicher, Judicial NullificationL: Guido
Calebresi's Uncommon Common Law for a Statutory Age, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1126,
1132 (1982) where the point is made that judges should not be able to treat obsoles-
cent public law statutes like obsolete common law cases since the whole point of the
"statutory scheme is its radical disjuncture with the common law trend."
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the area to be regulated, and the interplay between factual back-
ground - be it technical, scientific or economic - and the necessary
legal analysis is always part of the process of shaping statutes to
resolve complex contemporary problems.t I 3
While programmatic legislation was the New Deal's response to a
great crisis, and while it may be associated by its origins with the
welfare state, the examples that follow show that programmatic legis-
lation is not so limited. Programmatic legislation in environ mental
law, or in the area of product controls is not necessarily "tainted" by
the social attitudes of the welfare state.1 1
4
I submit that programmatic legislation is truly a new form engaged
in new tasks, tasks that are new both in their dimensions and com-
plexity. The earliest category of programmatic legislation included
modern social insurance legislation, such as social security legislation,
legislation providing for work-related injuries, unem ployment insu-
rance, health benefit programs, pension programs, and the like. It
also included social welfare programs that are not work-related, such
as old-age insurance, and a variety of protections against illness and
accident.
Programmatic legislation establishes social insurance programs, as
well as direct service programs for the rendition of health care, from
well-baby clinics to crisis management centers, mental health com-
munity centers and drug and alcohol treatment facilities. In the Uni-
ted States such federal programs are frequently grant-in-aid pro-
grams, and in accordance with basic federal requirements, they may
be administered by the states with federal assistance; they often
require the provision of matching state funds. I 5 To define program-
113. For an early account of the need for substantive knowledge of the field in
drafting programmatic legislation, see Landis, The Legislative History of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 29 (1959). The article includes a description
of the staff work and the collection of factual data which preceded the drafting of
this significant example of New Deal legislation.
114. But see B. Ackerman and W. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the
Clean Air Act, 89 Yale L.J. 1466 (1980) which examines the failure of the Clean Air
Act to deal adequately with choices relating to the accomplishment of sulphur
dioxide standards. The article considers the basic administrative scheme a New Deal
approach would have followed. It also considers the outcome of an ends-oriented
"agency forcing" effort which pushed the administrative process beyond the New
Deal and strayed from earlier tenets of sound legislative and administrative
decisionmaking.
115. See e.g., Clean Water Act, §§201-202, 33 U.S.C.A., §§1281-1282 which
provides for federal support for public waste treatment works, on condition of state
contribution, raised to forty-five percent in 1982, effective 1984.
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matic legislation in terms of grant programs is too limited, however.
Programmatic legislation may also include significant regulatory
elements. Housing legislation involves both grants to states and local-
ities, and the subsidization of persons unable to afford privately built
housing. But it also sets standards for compliance with a variety of
building and housing code requirements. Grants for hospital con-
struction, for instance, involve both a grant program and physical
facility, staff and service requirements for the institution to be
subsidized.
I would include in my category of programmatic legislation the
statutes which authorize regulations of such breadth as to require
major governmental organizations to render them effective. Modern
food and drug regulation falls into this category, 1 6 as do the vast
statutory and administrative structures for environmental pollution
control. 7 A sophisticated, modern system of regulation that subjects
new drugs to pre-market testing, that provides for the experimental
use of drugs under controlled conditions, or that limits the use of
certain drugs to specific conditions is so different from the old prohi-
bitions on the sale of "poisons" without proper labelling as to
amount to a generic difference in the legal approach itself." 8 The
environmental law area provides similar examples. A modern law
that provides for effluent limitations and for the setting of detailed
ambient water quality standards is so different from older laws that
prohibit the fouling and pollution of streams as to be barely compar-
able - we truly speak of legislation of a different kind. 9 For anoth-
er instance, compare the old municipal ordinances that prohibited
"loud and unnecessary noise"' 20 with the modern noise pollution
control codes, particularly the federal Noise Control Act of 1976
which does not control noise directly but which creates a program for
116. See e.g., Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, supra note
117. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §7401, et seq.; Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C.A., § 1521 et seq.; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (Solid Waste) 42
U.S.C.A., §6901 etseq..
118. See supra notes 18 and 19.
119. Compare the 1899 Refuse Act (Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899), which
prohibits the discharge or deposit of "any refuse matter of any kind or description
shatever" in any navigable water of the U.S., and the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C.A. §301, with its highly technical and detailed provisions for the promulga-
tion of a variety of effluent limitations.
120. Grad and Hack, Noise Control in the Urban Environment, 1972 Urban Law
Annual 3, 10-12.
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the control of the noise-producing product!' 2' Another tavonte
example of mine is the old New York City Sanitary Code provision
prohibiting the discharge of "dense smoke," applied in 1937 against
the Queen Mary anchored in New York Harbor,'22 compared to the
complex provisions relating to the emission of sulfur dioxide and
suspended particulates administered under the necessarily detailed
administrative scheme of the Clean Air Act. 
123
Another area of major programmatic legislation, of growing
importance and impact, is the area of product controls. Closely
related at times with environmental and health controls, product
controls should receive special attention because they operate so
directly on our industrial and commercial life.' 24 Major program-
matic legislation emphasizing product controls include the relatively
early 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), 125 the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FFRA), 2 6 first
enacted in 1947, the 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act TOSCA)
127
and the 1972 Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA). 28 These laws
share a concern for public health and safety, to be advanced by the
regulatory control of potentially dangerous products, generally in
advance of their use or application by the public to whom they are
sold. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, for instance,
imposes health and safety controls on the substances it regulates,
imposing the requirement of pre-marketing demonstration of safety
only on new drugs. An older law, it places the burden on the Federal
Food and Drug Administrtion to show hazard or damage before the
distribution of a product may be limited. In the drug area, the manu-
facturers have the burden, however, of showing both effectiveness
and freedom from hazard before a new drug may be registered and
121. Noise Control Act of 1972,42 U.S.C.A. §4901 et seq., especially NCA §6, 42
U.S.C.A. §4905, Noise Emission Standards for Products Distributed in Commerce.
122. People v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 280 N.Y. 413, 21 N.E. 2d 489 (1939). The
case involved the application of the New York City Sanitary Code §211 (now
obsolete) to ocean liners in foreign commerce.
123. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §7401, especially CAA § 109, 42 U.S.C.A. §7409,
National Ambient Air Quality Standards, and CAA § 110 (a) (2) (B) referring to
emission limitations applied by way of state implementation plans.
124. See, generally, Grad, F. TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, §4A.01,
Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Toxic Wastes - Overview of Major
Legislation.
125. 21 U.S.C.A. §301 etseq..
126. 7U.S.C.A. §136 et seq..
127. 15 U.S.C.A. §2601 etseq..
128. 15 U.S.C.A. §2051 etseq..
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placed on the market. 129
All of this product safety legislation is complex, lengthy and
detailed. It reflects the technical complexity and scientific
sophistication of the fields which it regulates. It is largely prospective
in operation. It bears only remote similarity in the nature of its
controls to the common law requirements applicable to manufac-
turers of hazardous substances, and it has major impact on our
society in the organization of significant parts of our economic life
and in the distribution of the costs of consumer protection. Each of
the mentioned statutes requires the establishment of a program and
an administrative structure for its effectiveness. 1
30
The prevalence of programmatic legislation is not limited to the
United States. Canada, too, has had similar developments in such
fields as the Old Age Security Act, Old Age Assistance Act, and the
more recent Canada Pension Plan and Assistance Plan, was well as in
the advanced Health Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act.
Canada, too, has developed substantial programs in environmental
protection. It is not surprising that we, in America, share substantial
legislative developments. We also share the increasing complexity of
our industrial and commercial life, and the growing expectation that
the state will protect our health and safety. Not surprisingly, we share
the need for massive government programs and for new forms of
legislation to create them.
Programmatic legislation is here to stay, and though there may be
occasional setbacks in social insurance and other benefit and service
programs, and though there may be budget cutbacks in programs for
the protection of health and safety, it is not likely that major social
insurance programs or major service or regulatory programs will be
dismantled even by a change to a more conservative government that
is philosophically opposed to such state involvement.
It is unavoidable that some of the discussion of programmatic
legislation verges on the political issues of our time, on the proper role
of government, and on the future prospects for the welfare state.
Legislation has always been a political subject, and the style of
legislation necessarily reflects the political realities of an age. Just as
late nineteenth century legislation emphasized minimal interference
with the common law notions of individual property rights and
freedom of contract, so does the programmatic legislation of the
129. 21 U.S.C.A. §355.
130. See supra note 111.
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twentieth century mirror the concerns of our age. Besides, the current
opposition to "big government" legislation, and the effort to
discredit welfare and social insurance legislation in the name of
promoting self-reliance and industry bears an uncanny similarity to
the turn of the century opposition to the "excesses" of legislation.
I believe that programmatic legislation is a new kind of legislation,
which differs in significant ways from earlier statutes in its form and
its approaches. There have been earlier examples of programmatic
legislation, but as a general phenomenon programmatic legislation is
distinctly characteristic of the twentieth century. It is a functional
response to the unique and uniquely complex problems of our times.
As in other fields, form follows function, and the complexity and
technical detail, and the delegation of responsibility for their
resolution, reflect the tasks the legislation must fulfill. When
opponents of such legislation voice formal objections to its
complexity and to its detail, when they advocate leaving the
resolution of problems to common law, or when they urge statutory
simplification, they reflect their nostalgia for a past when life was less
complicated and the resolution of problems called for simpler
responses, statutory or otherwise.
The interpretation of programmatic legislation would seem to
present relatively few problems, if the courts and administrative
agencies give full recognition to the statutory scheme. Such legisla-
tion is clearly in derogation of the common law, just as it is clearly
remedial in scope. When applied to three volumes of social security
legislation, or to the two hundred pages of the Clean Water Act, the
application of restrictive rules of construction seems strangely out of
place. What is called for is purpose interpretation, and the rule in
Heydon's Case - decided in the Court of Exchequer in 1584, exactly
three hundred years ahead of our time - would seem to do nicely.
As Heydon's Case puts it, the court's job is as follows:
"And it was resolved by them, that for the sure and true interpre-
tation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restric-
tive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be dis-
cerned and considered:-
"1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
"2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common
law did not provide.
"3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed
to cure the disease of the commonwealth.
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And 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of
all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress
the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro
privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and
remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro
bono publico. " '3
I believe that the fourth paragraph wisely instructs us to give force
and life to the statute, and to give it in full measure. Whenever a
question arises of the proper interpretation of the statute in a particu-
lar case, that interpretation should be preferred which advances the
program established by the legislature as a whole, as determined from
the statute itself and its legislative history. The emphasis should be on
the advancement of the program as a whole, and not on eking out
evidence of specific intent relating to the application of one of its
subsidiary provisions. The rule in Heydon's Case has been submerged
far too long in the debris of strict construction.
Viewed simplistically, this would seem to leave little room for the
court's interpretation of statutes. This is clearly not the case as cur-
rent decisions on a variety of laws will show. The broad programmat-
ic nature of such contemporary legislation requires the delegation of
certain definitional matters, and matters of inclusion or exclusion to
the agency charged with the law's administration. From early
workers' compensation statutes on, the courts have had to deal with
such problems of broad delegation. Workers' compensation entitle
the worker to certain benefits whenever he or she suffers a "work-re-
lated injury." A worker suffers a heart attack at the workplace while
working on his usual, not particularly stressful task. Is the heart
attack a "work-related injury?"' 32 Or take the Clean Air Act. The
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must
set standards of performance for new sources which "shall reflect the
degree of emission limitation and the percentage reduction which
(taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduc-
tion, any non-air quality health and environmental impact and
energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been ade-
quately demonstrated."'3 The usual canons of construction are
impossible to apply. When a particular standard is challenged as too
131. 3 Coke 7a, 76 Engl. Rep. 637 (Court of Exchequer, 1584).
132. E.g., Windust v. Department of Labor and Industries 52 Wash. 2d 33, 323, P.
2d 241 (1958).
133. CAA §I11 (1), 42 U.S.C.A. §7411 (1).
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stringent or too lenient, the question for the court is to inquire
whether the particular technical or scientific resolution of the prob-
lem by the Administrator meets the terms of delegation of the statute
in the light of its general purpose.34 The court's task under such
legislation has surely changed - but the court retains its earlier,
ultimate responsibility for statutory construction, and it need not fear
displacement.
VI. Conclusion
If further developments in the direction of more, and more advanced
programmatic legislation are likely, the implications for legal educa-
tion should be significant. Those of us who teach not only legislation,
but also legislative research and drafting, have long been dissatisfied
with law school curricula which emphasize case law skills, such as the
fine art of distinguishing earlier cases, of telling holding from dictum,
and other case law skills, mistakenly believed to constitute the spirit
of the common law. Too many law schools still offer no courses in
legislation, and give inadequate attention to the subject of reading
statutes. As a result, too many lawyers do not know how to read a
statute and would not be able to tell modem programmatic legisla-
tion from any other kind. Whether or not you agree that there is
anything distinctly new and different in programmatic legislation,
law schools which have not done so already must remedy the statuto-
ry illiteracy of students. Complex modern programmatic legislation
requires a facility for dealing with statutes. If possible, lawyers should
be trained to enjoy the well-crafted structure of a lengthy and
detailed statute, and to recognize and comprehend the interrelation-
ship of its parts. They should at least be able to read it in its entirety
and with an understanding of how its parts contribute to the opera-
tion of the whole.
There is probably no better way to learn how to read a statute than
by learning to draft one. The development of extensive statutory
schemes is increasingly paralleled by detailed policy studies by trained
staffs. Such staffs must be capable not only of legal research, but also
of relating their legal studies to the practical knowledge of the field,
so as to be in a position to ask for and to receive policy instruction
from the responsible policymakers. In addition, lawyers trained in
legislative research and drafting should also be in a position to pro-
134. E.g., National LimeAssociation v. EPA, 627 F. 2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See
also, supra note 110.
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vide the policymakers with an analysis of the range of policy alterna-
tives, and of alternative sanctions and remedies to achieve the major
purposes most effectively.
Today, the overwhelming number of cases decided involve sta-
tutes, and the legislative output of the national legislatures, and of
the state and provincial legislatures in Canada and the U.S. increases
steadily. Not only is most of our law statutory, but the nature of our
statutes has changed. Our statutes are increasingly more comprehen-
sive, technically more complex, and employed in the establishment of
significant programs. They are instrumental not only in changing our
private law but also in creating vast new fields of public law, which
restructure our society and our institutional and legal relationships.
It has taken some time for legislation to achieve its dominant
position as a source of modern law. The ascendancy of legislation is
likely to be permanent, and it is also likely to persist in the new forms
of programmatic legislation seeking to cope with the complexities of
our age.
